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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
RAY McCONNELL,
Plaintiff & Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 96'3'5

THE COMMISSION OF
FINANCE OF UTA'H,
Defendant & Appellant.
RESPONDEN'T'S PE'TI'TION FOR REHEARING
AND SUPPORTING BRIEF
Ray M·cConnell, the plaintiff and respondent
in the above-entitled matter, by and through his
attorneys of record herein, pursuant to Rule 76 (e),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for a rehearing in the
above-entitled action upon the following grounds:
1

1. The decision is erroneous because in effect
it holds that the provisions of Section 3·5-1-62,
U.C.A., 19;53, apply only when a recovery is effected through the filing of a lavvsuit, and then only
between parties named in the lawsuit, which is
contrary to the wording of the seetion itself which
1
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states that it shall apply to any recovery obtained
against the third party tort feasor.
2. 'The construction placed upon subsection
('2) nullifies the requirements of subsection ( 1 )
since it would require the injured employee to pay
the total 1amount of attorney's fees involved regardless of the amount of the recovery or who were
parties to the action, if one is filed.
The decision completely ignores and is contrary to the doctrine of equitable subrogation which
Section 35-1-62 incorporates and which has long
been recognized at common law.
3.

WHEREFORE, respondent respectfully requests that a rehearing be granted, that the court
re-examine the law applicable to this case, and that
an order be entered affirming the judgment of the
trial court, or in the alternative, that the case be
remanded to the trial court for a determination of
any issues of fact which this court may deem necessary.
HANSON & BALDWIN and
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH
By-------------------------------------------------------Attorneys for
Plaintiff & Respondent
515 Kearns Building
Balt Lake Crty, Utah
2
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CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
I certify that I am one of the counsel for respondent, petitioner herein, and that in my opinion
there is good cause to believe the judgment objected
to is erroneous and that the case ought to be reexamined as prayed in the Petition, and that this
Petition is not filed for the purpose of delay or to
otherwise hinder the prosecution and final determination of this action.
HANSON & BALD'WIN and
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH
By-------------------------------------------------------Attorneys for
Plaintiff & Respondent
515 Kearns Building
Balt Lake Ci'ty, Utah
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF REHEARING
POINT I.
THE DECISION IS ERRONEOUS IN HOLDING
THAT SECTION 35-1-62, U.C.A., 1953, A'PPLIES ONLY
TO RECOVERIES OBTAINED THROUGH THE FILING OF LAWSUITS AND PARTIES TO THE LAWSUIT.

The Opinion states :
"With relation to the disbursement of the proceeds of a recovery against a third party, the
first subsection of the statute gives a first
priority to the payment of the costs, including attorney's fees, of the action. These ex3
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penses are to be apportioned among the
parties.

* *

*

"If an insurance carrier initiates an actio_n
under this statute against a t~i~~ party, or IS
made a party in the ~action 1n1bated ~y the
injured employee, any attorney's ~ee~ Incurred by it would fall within the pr1onty provided in subsection ( 1). However, in the instant ease, the State Insurance Fund was not
a party to the action and did not incur 'any
legal expenses.'' (Court's emphasis) .
According to the deeision, Seetion 35-1-62,
U.C.A., 19'63, would not govern the distribution of
a settlement recovery obtained before a lawsuit was
filed, since neither the injured employee nor the
insurance ~arrier would ever be parties to the action.
Such a result was obviously not intended by
the legislature since the seeond paragraph of the
statute states as follows:
''If any recovery is obtained against such
third person i t sh all be disbursed as follows:
1

1

( 1 ) The reasonable expense of the action,
including attorney's fees, shall be paid
and charged proportionately against
the parties as their interests may appear.
(2) The person liable for compensation

payments shall be reimbursed in full
for all payments made.
( 3) :rhe balance shall be paid to the inJUred employee or his heirs in case of
4
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death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy
in full any obligation thereafter accruing against the person liable for
compensation.'' (Emphasis added)
No Distinction or indication is made that the statute is to govern distribution of a recovery only
after a lawsuit is filed. To the contrary, it specifically states that if any recovery is obtained, it shall
be disbursed as provided for by the statute. Likewise, a reading of the entire statute clearly indicates that parties refers to parties in interest and
not to parties to a lawsuit. In 'the words of the .statute, the interest of the injured employee or his
heirs arises "when any injury or death ... shall
have been caused"; and the interest of the person
paying compensation arises when it "becomes obligated to pay com pen sation". A ruling by this court
that the provisions of Section 35-1-62 U.C.A., 1953,
apply only after a l~awsuit has been filed could
have chaotic effect upon the practice of workmen's
compensation law in this state.
1

1

·POINT II
THE DECISION IS ERRONEOUS IN THAT THE
CONSTRUCTION PLACED UPON SUBSECTION (2)
OF SECTION 35-1-62, U.S.A., 1953, REQUIRES THAT
THE TOTAL ATTORNEY'S FEE BE PAID FROM THE
EMPLOYEE'S SHARE OF THE RECOVERY.

The opinion states:
"Furthermore, subsection ( 2) , requires that
the insurance carrier be reimbursed in full,
5
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providing, of course, the amount of recovery
is sufficient to do so after payment of the
leg'al expenses, including attorne~s' fees. If
plaintiff were right in his contention tha~ an
insurance carrier is liable for its proprortlonate share of the cost and fees, then an insurance carrier would never be reimbursed in
full." (Court's emphasis).
According to this statement of the court, the insurance carrier is forever relieved of paying any
share of 'the attorney's fees, contrary to the requirement expressed in subsection ( 1), which states:
"The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees shall be paid and charged
proportionately against the parties as their
interests may appear."
It is elementary that there are only two parties in
interest to a recovery obtained against a third party
tort feasor. First, the injured employee, and second,
the person who has paid or who is obligated to pay
compensation. If disbursement were made according to the court's decision, the results would be as
follows:

First. The casts of the action would be paid,
including fees of the employee's attorney and
the insurance carrier's attorney, if the insurance company was named as a party.
Second: The insurance carrier would be reimbursed for the total !amount it had paid in
compensation or medical payments.
Third: The injured employee would receive
the remainder of the recovery.
6
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Therefore, the injured employee has in effect
paid both attorneys' fees because if the fees ar paid
first and the insurance carrier is then reimbursed
in full, the balance of the recovery which is paid
to the injured employee is reduced by the amount
of both attorneys' fees. Thus, the court's decision
would apparently provide for an apportionment of
the amount of a;ttorney's fee paid each attorney according to the interest of his principal in the action,
but would charge both fees against only one party
- the injured employee. This result would be in
direct opposition to the mandate of the legislature
that the attorneys' fees be charged proportionately
against the parties as their intere'sts may 'appear.
POINT III
THE DE·CISION IS CONTRARY TO ·THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE SUBROGATION RECOGNIZED
IN COM1PARABLE STATUTES AND A'T COMMON
LAW.

'There is some indication that our present statute, Section 35-1-62, U.C.A., 1953, was patterned
after the California statute on this subject since
Deering's California Labor Code is cited under the
"Comparable Provisions" section of 'the Uvah Code
Annotated, 1953. 'The California Statute, Section
3856, applicable to the payment of attorneys' fees
at the time our statute w'as rewritten in 1945, read
as follows:
"The court shall first 1apply, out of the entire
amount of any judgment for any damage re7
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covered by the employee, a sufficient amounft
to reimburse the employer for the amount o
his expenditures for compensation. _If the employer has not joined in the ac~ton or has
not brought action, or if his acti~n h!as _not
been consolidated the court, on h1s application, shall allow,' as a first lien against the
entire amount of any judgment for any dam!ages recovered by the employee, the amount
of the employer's expenditures for compensation; provided, however, that where the employer has failed to join in said action and to
be represented therein by his own attorney,
or where the employer has not made arrangements with the employee's attorney to represent him in said action, the court sh!all fix a
reasonable attorney's fee, which shall be fixed
as a share of the an1oun't actually received
by the employee, to be paid to the employee's
attorney on account of the services rendered
by him in effecting recovery for the benefit
of the employer which said fee shall be deducted from any amounts due the employer."
(Emphasis added)
While the Utah statute is worded in more concise terms, it is nevertheless comparable in that it
purports to cover all situations where" any recovery
is obtained" and provides that expenses of the action be "charged proportionately against the parties
as their interests may appear". However, the court's
decision in this case is far afield from the intent expressed in either statute. In the case of Hardware
Mutual Casualty Company vs. Butler, 148 P.2d 563
(Mont. 1944), the widow of a deceased employee
8
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retained an attorney of her own selection who
brought an appropriate 'a,ction against the third
par'ty tort feasor from which a cash settlement resulted. Regarding the payment of attorneys' fees
by the insurance carrier, the court stated:
"However, whereas here, one litigant has
borne the burden and expense of successful
litigation which has created and brought into
court !a fund in which others share with him,
it is only jus't and equitable that those who
share the benefits should :contribute to the
payment for the services of the attorney whose
labors resulted in creating or preserving of
such common fund."
Pennsy lvani1a also has a statute very similar
to our statute which provides that:
". . . reasonable attorneys' fees and o'ther
proper disbursements incurred in obtaining a
recovery or in effecting a compromise settlement between the employer and the employee,
if personal representative, his estate or his
dependen'ts."
In construing this provision, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
in Yeager vs. Heckman, 158 F. Supp. 933, stated
that in view of the provisions as to the distribution
of the proceeds of third party actions, it appears
that the legislature intended that the attorney's
fee was to be prorated between the employer and
the recipient of the compensation, to the extent th!at
each benefited from \the third party recovery. Short9
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ly thereafter, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
reached the same conclusion in the case of Soliday
vs. Hires, et al, 142 A. 2d 4'2:5, in which it stated:
"The logical conclusion is inescaprable that the
legislature intended that the employer be required to share the burden of attorneys' f~es
on the basis of its total benefit from the third
party recovery, that is, the total amount which
the carrier would have been called upon to
pay."
The Michigan statute on this point provides:
'''Expenses of recovery ( i'ncluding attorneys'
fees) shall be appropriated by the court between the parties as their interests appear at
the time of said recovery."
In Horsley vs. Stone & Webster Engineering
Corporation, 162 F. Supp. 649, the court held that
this statute required that the insurer pay a portion
of the !attorney's fee in the third pary action based
on the ratio of the amount of compensation paid
to the amount of the total recovery.
A well-seasoned opinion on facts very similar
to those in the instant case is found in Voris vs.
Gulf-Tide Steveadors, 211 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1954).
The a'ction against a third party was instituted on
behalf of minor children who had received coinpensation under the Federal Longshoremen's & Harbor
Workers Compensation Act. A judgment was entered
in the suit awarding the minor children $7,857.42,
the insurance carrier $1,7 42.58, and the child10
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ren's attorneys $3,900.00. Upon entry of this
judgment, the Deputy Commissioner entered a compensation order in which he directed that the employer and insurance carrier be given credit for the
sum of $7,85'7.4'2 against further ~compensation to
the minor children. H!owever, the trial court subsequently ruled that it was the total or gross amount
and not the net recovery which should be accredited
to the employer's payments.
The Court of Appeals analyzed !the decisive
question as being whether the anwunt recovered
means the amount actually received by the compensation benefici!aries in the third party act~on
('that is less attorneys' fees) or whether ·rt means
a total amount paid by the third party defendant.
In this regard, the court ~stated:
''''To hold that the minors recovered the aggregate /amount paid by the defendant would be
to discard the realities of the situation, and
to ignore the age old equita:ble principle that
'one who accomplishes the creation of a fund
for 1the benefit of another is entitled to reimbursement therefrom for the reasonable
costs thereby incurred. The doctrine of salvJage is akin to this principle.
1

*

*

*

" ... The insurance carrier was the sole beneficiary of the legal services rendered for
the plain tiff in the third party action, and
it does not appear that it was in any way
prejudiced by the judgment; on the contr!ary,
it was greatly benefited by it. 'The subrogee
11
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has accepted the benefits of that recovery,
and it should bear its reasonable burdens. It
would be great injustice to the minors .for
them to have to pay for services that benefited
them not at all. The courts draw back from
the construction of an ambiguous statute that
would lead to unjust results, just as nature
draws back from the 'consistency of one of its
laws that would encase i'n ice fish at the bottom of ~a river."
To allow the court's decision to stand in the
case at bar will freeze in the jurisprudence of this
sta'te equally unjust and irrational doctrines, i.e.,
(1) that Section 3'5-1-62, U.C.A., 1953, does not
apply to recoveries effected prior to the filing of
a legal lawsuit and (2) the injured employee must
always bear the burden of paying not only his own
attorney's fees, but !also the fees of the insurance
carrier's attorney if one is employed. It is submitted that the workmen compensation laws were
passed by the legislature to benefit injured employees
and, therefore, they should be construed to this end
if there is any inconsistencies in the provisions of
the a~ct.

12
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that on the law
referred to above, the decision of the trial ·court
should be affirmed, or in the alternative the case
remanded for a trial to determine any issues of
:eact not evident in the record which the court may
deem determinative of the issues involved.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & BALDWIN and
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH
By-------------------------------------------------------Attorneys for
Plaintiff and Respondent
51'5 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

